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ABSTRACT
This Article identifies substantial flaws in how U.S. government agencies and courts assess the impact of proposed mergers by firms using
broadband networks to reach consumers. Applying current market definitions, consumer impact assessments, and economic doctrine, antitrust enforcement agencies may fail to identify the risk of harm to consumers and
competition, a so-called false negative.
In recent years, the Department of Justice, Federal Communications
Commission, and Federal Trade Commission, individually and collectively,
have assessed the competitive consequences of numerous multibillion-dollar acquisitions and have conditionally approved almost all of them.
These agencies appear predisposed to favor deals that involve vertical integration between market segments, based on an assumption that short-term
consumer welfare gains would exceed any potential harms.
The Article concludes that reviewing government agencies appear too
willing to extend current assumptions about how “bricks and mortar” markets work to transactions occurring via broadband networks. By “fighting
the last war,” these agencies fail to identify new risks to consumer welfare,
particularly by ventures operating in multiple markets that do not readily
fit into the conventional assessment of mutually exclusive vertical and horizontal “food chains.” In a broadband ecosystem where both technologies
and markets converge, ventures can appear to offer consumers an incredible value proposition. Like economists’ determination that there is no
such thing as a free lunch, a better calibrated, multidimensional analysis
would identify significant offsetting harms to “free” internet services like
that offered by Facebook and Google.
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The Article suggests that the narrow fixation on near-term impact on
consumers and the prices they pay insufficiently assesses the potential for
harm, particularly for broadband-mediated service requiring no direct
cash payment from users. Government antitrust enforcement agencies
compound mistakes in market impact assessment by ignoring how internet firms finance services through often obscured collection, analysis,
and sale of consumer data. In light of increasing concentration in the
broadband markets, through mergers and the impact of converging technologies, surviving ventures can adversely impact both core and now more
closely integrated adjacent markets.
The Article examines how and why the FTC approved the acquisition
of DoubleClick by Google in 2007, having concluded insignificant competitive harm would occur even as Google quickly grew to dominate nearly all
sectors of the internet advertising marketplace. The Article also evaluates
whether, in conditionally approving Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal, Inc., the FCC failed to safeguard consumers. Additionally, the Article
considers whether AT&T, as anticipated by reviewing courts, flowed
through to consumers any of the anticipated efficiency gains and cost savings generated by its acquisition of Time Warner.
The Article concludes that recent and future internet acquisitions
have a much greater likelihood of generating legitimate concerns about
competitive and consumer harms, particularly as markets become ever
more concentrated and often dominated by a single firm. The Article
does not recommend a repudiation of Chicago School antitrust doctrine,
but recommends that reviewing agencies and courts calibrate empirical
measures of prospective costs and benefits to consumers from a proposed
merger by identifying short-term and longer-term impacts on core and adjacent markets.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE internet marketplace increasingly triggers complaints about the
efficacy of antitrust law enforcement that seems powerless or disinterested in constraining dominant Big Tech firms.1 Converging technologies
and markets favor firms able to acquire potential competitors2 while simultaneously accruing unmatched advantages in scale,3 scope,4 and network
externalities.5 The internet ecosystem appears to favor “winner-take-all”6
sweepstakes enhanced by limited government oversight, based on the assumption that consumers benefit when they can access attractive services
without having to make direct cash payments.7

1. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED
AGE (Columbia Glob. Reports, 2018); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,
126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); Maurice Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-Opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 278 (2019).
2. See e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45,
70–71 (2018) (detailing harm to competition when large firms acquire small, innovative companies).
3. Scale economies refers to the ability of a single firm to produce a good or
service at the lowest per unit cost. See Henry H. Perritt Jr., Keeping the Internet Invisible: Television Takes Over, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 121, 127 (2017).
4. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Innovation Agents, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 205–06
(2019) (explaining how an enterprise can reduce its overall cost-per-unit when it
produces two or more interrelated products, compared to firms producing each
product separately and in similar quantities).
5. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 300 (using the telephone system to demonstrate that the
value of a network increases as a function of the number of subscribers rises); see
also John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 681, 688–89 (2012).
6. Khan, supra note 1, at 785 (explaining the winner-take-all characteristic of
many online platform ventures); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma:
Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods Contents, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1861, 1876 (2011) (showing how single platform ventures can generate transaction cost savings for subscribers); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 413 (2014) (showing how
Google captured dominant market share in online advertising).
7. Natascha Just, Governing Online Platforms: Competition Policy in Times of
Platformization, 42 TELECOM. POL’Y 386, 387 (2018) (asserting the need for changes
in competition policy to consider how zero-priced transactions affect competition
and consumers).
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Legislators,8 academics,9 the court of public opinion,10 and belatedly,
the Department of Justice (DOJ),11 have begun to question the value proposition12 offered by largely unregulated internet firms, particularly when
these companies seek further market consolidation through mergers and
acquisitions. United States federal antitrust enforcement agencies and reviewing courts have not followed suit. By maintaining the status quo and
using current market definitions, consumer impact assessments, and economic doctrine, reviewers may approve mergers based on flawed assessments. False negatives fail to identify offsetting and quantifiable costs
incurred by consumers as well as less easily quantified harms to competition and consumers through privacy invasion, identity theft, and reduced
trust in governments, elections, news media, and capitalism.
In recent years, the DOJ, Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), individually and collectively, have assessed the competitive consequences of numerous multibillion-dollar acquisitions and have conditionally approved nearly all of
them.13 These agencies seem predisposed to favor deals that appear to
generate short-term consumer benefits. Agencies base the deals’
favorability on an evaluative criterion articulated by academics and practitioners embracing the so-called Chicago School model of antitrust market
assessment.14 This model emphasizes the duty of agencies with antitrust
8. Steve Lohr, Mike Isaac & Nathaniel Popper, Tech Hearings: Congress Unites to
Take Aim at Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/technology/big-tech-antitrust-hearing.html
[https://perma.cc/EF97-UGBQ]; Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking up Big
Tech, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-break-up-amazon-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/U9R7U3LW] (reporting on Senator Warren’s proposal to divest assets from America’s
largest tech companies).
9. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 973, 981 (2019) (arguing the need for structural rather than conduct antitrust remedies in digital markets).
10. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Public Attitudes Toward Technology Companies (June
28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/06/28/public-attitudestoward-technology-companies/ [https://perma.cc/95VK-GW8A].
11. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Katie Benner & Steve Lohr, Justice Department Opens
Antitrust Review of Big Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/07/23/technology/justice-department-tech-antitrust.html
[https://perma.cc/SV4Z-CMH8] (reporting Justice Department antitrust review of
major online technology firms).
12. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2017) (explaining how online ride sharing businesses exploit asymmetric information about consumers).
13. See, e.g., Current and Recent Major Transactions, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N
https://www.fcc.gov/transactions/recent-transactions [https://perma.cc/CDQ9ASZZ] (last updated Dec. 4, 2015).
14. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979) (suggesting that antitrust policy emphasize allocative efficiency in
markets); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1985) (summarizing orthodox Chicago School antitrust policy as
seeking to maximize economic efficiency); Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona M. Scott
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enforcement responsibilities to assess consumer and competitive merits of
mergers by prioritizing an assessment of whether the transaction results in
lower prices to consumers and greater efficiency. Additionally, current antitrust market assessment makes no distinction between conventional
transactions involving “bricks and mortar” ventures having a combination
of tangible and intangible assets and firms whose value accrues mostly
from intangible assets. Firms relying on broadband networks for the delivery of services do not always operate in discrete, mutually exclusive market
segments that can be mapped on a vertical or horizontal plane.15
Internet market acquisitions can have substantial near-term and
longer-term impacts that antitrust enforcement agencies may ignore or
fail to identify.16 Additionally, these agencies may overestimate the benefits from consumer access to “free” services,17 conditioned on ambiguous,
but valuable, collection,18 processing, analysis, and marketing of data
about consumers’ behavior.19
Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis (Inst. for Law and Econs.,
Research Paper No. 19-44, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481388 [permalink
unavailable].
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KW9-NCFG]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/05/18/2614.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9J2-HUGL].
16. Charles A. Miller, Note, Big Data and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 309, 311–12 (2019) (suggesting that a merger between
Facebook and Comcast would presumptively pass muster with the Justice Department, because under current merger guidelines, these firms would appear not to
compete directly in any market for goods or services).
17. See Michal Gal & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2016) (noting that free goods
may promote competition, but in other instances raise complex questions about
overall welfare gains or losses to consumers); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan
Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 606 (2014); John Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015) (asserting that heavy methodological dependence on
consumer prices has led antitrust courts and enforcement agencies to overlook
massive welfare harms to consumers).
18. See Angelo Ilumba, Fact: A Truly Unlimited Data Plan Doesn’t Exist, WHISTLE
OUT (July 13, 2018), https://www.whistleout.com/CellPhones/Guides/Fact-ATruly-Unlimited-Data-Plan-Doesnt-Exist [permalink unavailable] (explaining that
few subscribers of “free” internet services realize that, in addition to allowing collection of valuable consumer behavior data, they also agree to allow data collectors
to use their wired or wireless broadband data transmission subscription to
download monitoring software and to upload the surveillance results).
19. When discussing methods of data collection by internet platforms, Natascha Just writes:
A central characteristic of internet platforms is that they generate, collect,
process and aggregate big data through sophisticated algorithmic methods in order to extract economic value from it . . . . This concerns both
the data and contents of competitors as well as the unprecedentedly available data on individuals’ personal information, behavior, communication, and transactions.
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Vertical mergers involve integration of two ventures up or down a
“food chain” of market segments.20 Because antitrust enforcement agencies assume these parties operate in different markets and have not engaged in direct competition, merger approval typically occurs.21
Horizontal mergers trigger closer scrutiny because the proposed transaction involves two firms whose combination concentrates a single market
and reduces the number of standalone competitors.22 In both evaluative
planes, reviewing agencies and courts emphasize the downstream impact
on consumers with less concern for upstream impacts on competitors and
possibly no concern about firms operating in adjacent markets affected by
how the acquiring and acquired companies do business.
Additionally, antitrust enforcement agencies appear unable or unwilling to consider instances where a merger or acquisition has multidimensional impacts23 with simultaneous impacts on vertical, horizontal, core,
and adjacent markets.24 For example, consider the speedy and multifaceted market diversification of Amazon. The company started off as a
Just, supra note 7, at 391; see also Sofia Grafanki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big
Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803 (2017); Max N. Helveston,
Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH U. L. REV. 859 (2016); Miller,
supra note 16; Newman, supra note 6; Sheri B. Pan, Get to Know Me: Protecting Privacy
and Autonomy Under Big Data’s Penetrating Gaze, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239 (2016);
Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339
(2017); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Dig Data, 23
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129 (2016).
20. See Vertical Mergers, Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMM’N https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/
competitive-effects [https://perma.cc/YN25-WA3W] (last visited May 20, 2020).
21. Brent Skorup & Adam Thierer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on
Vertical Integration in the Information Economy, 65 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 173 (2013)
(explaining that under current DOJ merger guidelines, non-horizontal mergers
involve firms that do not operate in the same market, and therefore, their combination would result in no immediate change in the level of market concentration).
22. The FTC defines a horizontal merger as follows:
A horizontal merger eliminates a competitor, and may change the competitive environment so that the remaining firms could or could more
easily coordinate on price, output, capacity, or other dimension of competition. As a starting point, the agencies look to market concentration
as a measure of the number of competitors and their relative size. Mergers occurring in industries with high shares in at least one market usually
require additional analysis.
Horizontal Mergers, Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMM’N https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects
[https://perma.cc/YN25-WA3W] (last visited May 20, 2020).
23. Perritt Jr., supra note 3, at 159 (proposing to divide the video content
marketplace into six discrete segments: the market for programmer acquisition of
content; programmer access to distribution; viewer access to distribution; advertiser access to programming; advertiser access to distributors; and advertiser access
to viewers).
24. Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative
Markets: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Google?, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 59, 59 (2008)
(asserting that current antitrust analysis “does not adequately account for the impact of multi-sided network effects . . . or on competition”).
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retail vendor of books but vertically and horizontally integrated by creating, packaging, selling, and storing all sorts of content. Now, Amazon is
fully integrated up and down in vertical and side-by-side horizontal markets. It also operates as both a competitor of other internet ventures and a
vendor of services these competitors need and willingly rely on Amazon to
deliver, e.g., internet cloud25 storage and transmission of content to
consumers.
Ride sharing services, such as Uber and Lyft, offer insights about the
direct, secondary, and tertiary impacts of internet-mediated services. Direct benefits accrue for transportation consumers in terms of price, availability, and innovation, but offsetting direct costs also can result. Data
mining provides ride sharing companies “real time” access to current market conditions in terms of availability of drivers and their proximity to customers requesting service. Access to current supply and demand, coupled
with the ability to change offered prices, generates mixed outcomes for
consumers. Freed of the obligation to pay a fixed, tariffed rate filed with a
taxicab authority, consumers in low demand, high capacity conditions can
accrue transportation savings. However, constant and up-to-the-minute
surveillance of supply and demand also can result in “surge pricing” with
rates quoted far in excess of the fixed taxicab rate. While economists
might champion better calibrated pricing, based on real time measurements of supply and demand elasticities, surge price paying consumers
might be far less enthused.
Price, consumer welfare, and competitive impacts extend beyond the
direct impact on individual transportation consumers. Secondary impacts
include the effect of ride sharing platforms on the overall cost of local, forhire transportation. Positive impacts may include an increase in the total
number of available vehicles and a lower average price paid per unit of
distance and time, even factoring in surge pricing, but negative, secondary
impacts also can occur. For example, the rise in new full- and part-time
rideshare drivers for hire may reduce the value of taxicab medallions that
some cities auction off. Reduction in auction proceeds might create incentives for taxicab authorities to increase the number of available medallions, thus, further reducing their value and triggering market exit by
preexisting drivers. These drivers might have to then declare bankruptcy
in light of their inability to pay back loans secured to pay for the far more
expensive medallion. Ironically, government efforts to stimulate market
entry could trigger the opposite outcome.

25. The internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks
that make up the internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these
networks and the content available via these networks. See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010) (explaining how “cloud computing”
represents the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s
computers over the internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer).
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Tertiary impacts affect a possible large segment of the local population, irrespective of whether they use ride sharing services. Positive impacts include the possibility of migration from public transportation to
ride sharing services, particularly during off-peak hours when prices are at
their lowest. Additionally, some operators of privately owned vehicles will
migrate to ride sharing, possibly reducing congestion and pollution. Negative impacts include the likelihood of increased road congestion, even
taking into consideration the possible reduction in privately operated vehicles. If the total number of vehicles on the road increases, then higher
congestion and pollution affect users of ride sharing services, public transportation riders, and drivers of privately operated vehicles. Everyone suffers when a shared resource, e.g., public roads, becomes congested with a
surfeit of vehicles.26
The internet’s ascendancy and that of ventures using broadband networks to deliver services have substantially impacted both incumbent and
new markets. However, antitrust enforcement agencies do not appear inclined to acknowledge the need to adjust their evaluative process for assessing the impact on consumers and competition. Merger reviewers
appear to have forgotten old lessons about antitrust and markets while
also ignoring new lessons generated by transactions in the internet
marketplace.
A false negative, showing no harm to consumer welfare, can occur if
merger review ignores the long-standing economic rule that “there is no
such thing as a free lunch”27 in the commercial marketplace. While many
broadband-mediated services, such social networks like Facebook and
Twitter, do not require monthly cash payments, subscribers must allow
these firms to acquire, collate, process, analyze, and sell data about their
wants, needs, desires, interests, purchases, viewpoints, and location. Social
network subscribers may consider “data mining”28 a fair trade-off. It forecloses the need to make direct, financial payments while facilitating participation in an enjoyable and apparently welfare-enhancing series of free
transactions. Social network subscribers may underestimate the nature,
scope, and value of their personal data,29 particularly in light of the hid26. A “tragedy of the commons” occurs when “a resource that is designated
for common usage is prone to despoliation as individual users increase their consumption of the resource without taking care to ensure that they do not overuse
the resource.” Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 674 (2005).
27. John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 515 (2018)
(reporting on the origin of the adage “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch”).
28. Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification of Data Mining, 16 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 309, 310 (2013) (defining data mining as database analysis that
attempts to discover useful patterns or relationships).
29. Steve Lohr, Calls Mount to Ease Big Tech’s Grip on Your Data, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/business/calls-mount-toease-big-techs-grip-on-your-data.html [https://perma.cc/A3B6-PZ6G] (explaining
how data mining works).
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den financial transactions taking place between social networks and advertisers that participate in auctions for the opportunity to place better
targeted commercial pitches on websites.30
Antitrust enforcement agencies should offset their identification of
consumer benefits with also triggered countervailing costs. The balancing
of benefits and costs does not currently occur, particularly when it is easier
to limit market assessment to downstream impacts on consumers that can
be readily identified and quantified.31 Assessing harms to consumers and
competitors requires more nuance, speculation, and projections, particularly for upstream impacts between vendors of free services and the advertisers, data brokers, and data analytics firms that pay for access to
subscribers of broadband-delivered services. Additionally, it may not be
feasible to identify and quantify both near-term and longer term harms
generated by these upstream commercial transactions. For example, few
dispute that foreign governments had an impact on the United States
2016 presidential election,32 but no consensus exists as to the directly attributable effects on the vote tally and trust in governments, news media,
and other institutions.
Antitrust enforcement agency officials may dismiss as unproven and
counterintuitive allegations that internet firms harm consumers and competitors, particularly when consumers readily subscribe to “free” and quite
popular services. However, a more sophisticated and granular analysis can
identify offsetting costs,33 such as privacy invasion, identity theft, reduction or elimination of consumer surplus,34 increased risks, loss of trust in
30. Nicole E. Pottinger, Note, Don’t Forget to Subscribe: Regulation of Online Advertising Evaluated Through Youtube’s Monetization Problem, 107 KY. L.J. 515, 522
(2018) (explaining how data mining makes it possible for advertisers to tailor a
specific advertisement to a specific person at the correct time and in the right
format using the information the advertiser has gathered about the individual).
31. Erik Brynjolfsson, Avinash Collis & Felix Eggers, Using Massive Online
Choice Experiments to Measure Changes in Well-Being, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Feb. 24,
2019), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1815663116 [https://perma.cc/PX9W98S5] (estimating that the median Facebook user required compensation of
around $48 to give it up for a month).
32. See Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, 12 Russian Agents Indicted in Mueller
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/us
/politics/mueller-indictment-russian-intelligence-hacking.html [https://
perma.cc/5FN7-GZYV]; Matt Apuzzo & Sharon LaFraniere, 13 Russians Indicted as
Mueller Reveals Effort to Aid Trump Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russians-indicted-mueller-election-in
terference.html [https://perma.cc/6UT5-3Z4W].
33. See, e.g., Robert Shapiro & Siddhartha Aneja, Who Owns Americans’ Personal
Information and What Is It Worth?, FUTURE MAJORITY (Mar. 8, 2019), https://as
sets.futuremajority.org/uploads/report-for-future-majority-on-the-value-of-peoples-personal-data-shapiro-aneja-march-8-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8AZ-ECBD]
(quantifying the value of Americans’ personal information gathered and used by
major internet platforms, data brokers, credit card, and healthcare data
companies).
34. For example, data mining can provide better insights on a prospective
customer’s intensity of demand for a particular good or service and tolerance for
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government, elections, the news media, and capitalism, and the reduction
or elimination of competition.
Reviewing government agencies appear to overemphasize past and
current marketplace conditions rather than assess future impacts on consumers and competition. By “fighting the last war,” these agencies fail to
identify new risks to consumer welfare, particularly by ventures operating
in multiple markets that do not readily fit into the conventional assessment of mutually exclusive vertical and horizontal planes. In an ecosystem
where both technologies and markets converge, ventures can appear to
offer consumers an incredible value proposition akin to a “free lunch.” A
better calibrated, multidimensional analysis would identify significant benefits, but also significant, offsetting harms.
The narrow fixation on near-term impact on consumers’ out-ofpocket costs, as well as the tendency to treat complex deals solely as either
vertical or horizontal arrangements, increasingly fail to identify longer
term harms to both competition and consumers. With the internet marketplace becoming increasingly concentrated through mergers and the
impact of converging technologies, surviving ventures have the potential
to impact both core and now more closely integrated adjacent markets.
This Article examines how and why the FTC approved the acquisition
of DoubleClick by Google in 200735 based on a determination of insignificant competitive harm, even though the internet advertising market
quickly became concentrated and dominated by Google. The Article also
evaluates whether the FCC successfully imposed or secured voluntary conditions that accrued measurable benefits to consumers, such as lower
prices reflecting Comcast’s reduced programming costs when it acquired

price increases. Better calibration of so-called demand and price elasticity makes it
possible for vendors to adjust prices with an eye toward maximizing profits. This
occurs when a ride sharing vendor, such as Uber, substantially raises prices to reflect immediate changes in the current supply of drivers and demand for service.
“More generally, discriminatory pricing can ‘introduce distortion into the overall
market’ by ‘disadvantaging certain classes’ of complementors and decreasing the
profits available to them by diverting more consumer surplus to the dominant platform.” Khan, supra note 9, at 1096 (quoting BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 277 (2010)); see also Keyawna Griffith, Note, The
Uber Loophole That Protects Surge Pricing, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 34, 43–44 (2019)
(explaining how the Robinson–Patman Price Discrimination Act does not apply to
ride sharing transactions); Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark
Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019) (posing questions
about how lawmakers can create legal objectives and requirements for transactions
that can be modified by software).
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, (Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-commstmt.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZR5B-K9HJ] [hereinafter FTC APPROVAL OF DOUBLECLICK
ACQUISITION].
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NBC Universal, Inc.36 Additionally, the Article considers whether having
also eliminated video program access costs, AT&T passed along any cost
savings to its customers when the company acquired Time Warner.37
Recent and future internet acquisitions have a much greater likelihood for generating legitimate concerns about competitive and consumer
harms, particularly as markets become concentrated or dominated by a
single firm. It appears that a strict and unrevised application of Chicago
School emphasis on consumer welfare38 can fail to identify real, possibly
near-term adverse effects on consumers and competition:
[T]he Chicago School’s backward-looking approach is flawed in
its logic and ignores legislative history. More importantly, focusing on consumer welfare to the exclusion of everything else, and
using market efficiency to do so, disregards the new and unique
challenges presented by the twenty-first-century market. The
world has changed dramatically with the internet, and the current framework of antitrust law is not equipped to deal with the
change.39
Antitrust enforcement agencies and courts should use better calibrated measures of prospective consumer costs and benefits of a proposed
merger and make both short-term and longer-term predictions of how
combined firms will impact both core and related markets.
I. CONVERGING INTERNET MARKETS

AND

TECHNOLOGIES

Convergence in internet markets favors concentration by ventures
able to exploit favorable economies of scale and scope by offering a variety
of attractive services to consumers who typically use a limited number—
36. Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. and NBC Universal, Inc.
for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, 26 F.C.C. Rcd.
4238 (2011), order clarified, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 15,053 (2012).
37. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 254 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d,
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
38. Critical assessors of the consumer welfare model offer thoughtful, worthwhile analysis. See, e.g., ROBERT PITOFSKY, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 1
(Pitofsky ed., 2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2018); Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71 (2018); Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The
“Protection of Competition” Standard in Practice, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 12
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
AC_APRIL.pdf [permalink unavailable].
39. Zachariah Foge, American Oligarchy: How the Enfeebling of Antitrust Law Corrodes the Republic, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 119, 130 (2019) (rejecting Chicago School antitrust principles as ill-suited for twenty-first century markets); see
also Thomas J. Horton, Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values, 16 U. N.H. L. REV. 179
(2018) (supporting the injection of social, political, moral, and economic values in
antitrust enforcement); Barak Orbach, The Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1439 (2019) (advocating a resurrection of public and political interest in antitrust enforcement).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/1

12

Frieden: Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom About Mergers and Consumer

2020]

CHALLENGES

TO

WISDOM ABOUT MERGERS

491

often just one—broadband link to the internet cloud. Many internet markets reward single ventures with dominant market shares in a “winner-takeall” contest. So-called unicorn ventures40 can quickly acquire billion-dollar valuations based on accrual of positive network externalities where
company revenues and consumer welfare both increase with growth in the
number of subscribers.
Many internet ventures serve as an intermediary between downstream
consumers and upstream companies offering products, services, content,
and advertising via the internet venture’s platform.41 This two-sided market42 makes it possible for platform operators and upstream ventures to
enhance their commercial attractiveness by offering downstream consumers access to attractive services without requiring direct cash payments.
Platform intermediaries can calibrate payment streams, often opting to secure all direct financial compensation from upstream ventures willing to
pay for data collected by the intermediary about consumers’ wants, needs,
desires, web searches, location, prior purchases, and communications via
social media and other forums.43
Consumers have widely embraced this value proposition even as they
may not fully appreciate the nature and scope of the nonpecuniary compensation they provide platform operators.44 Intermediaries appearing to
offer free goods and services have triggered little, if any, government scrutiny. Such regulatory forbearance helped incubate the internet based on a
40. “ ‘Unicorns’ are private companies with valuations of a billion dollars or
more.” Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy,
57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 583 (2016). “As their name indicates, unicorns were originally
so rare as to be almost mythical. But Uber and other technology companies have
ushered in a new era: we now have a blessing of unicorns, each one of which has
the potential to transform financial and cultural norms.” Id.
41. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 146
(2017) (“[P]latforms both enable and benefit from competitive dynamics of economic exchange that differ in profoundly important ways from those of traditional, one-sided markets”); see also Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 87 (2016).
42. Two-sided markets can be defined as follows:
[T]he volume of transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not only on the overall level of fees charged by the platform. A
platform’s usage or variable charges impact the two sides’ willingness to
trade once on the platform and, thereby, their net surpluses from potential interactions; the platforms’ membership or fixed charges in turn condition the end-users’ presence on the platform.
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND. J.
ECON. 645, 646 (2006).
43. See Rob Frieden, Two-Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both Upstream and Downstream Impacts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 713 (2019) [hereinafter Frieden,
Two-Sided Internet Markets]; Rob Frieden, The Internet of Platforms and Two-Sided Markets: Implications for Competition and Consumers, 63 VILL. L. REV. 269 (2018).
44. See Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and the Digital Audience,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1601 (2019) (explaining that while subscribers accrue ample benefits from access a wealth of information, they lack knowledge
about how to protect personal data).
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non-quantified, general sense that consumers have benefitted. Additionally, the “court of public opinion” did not object to the deal struck between platform operators and consumers whose access to “free” content
and services is contingent on the legal right of the intermediary to engage
in extensive and financially lucrative surveillance,45 data collection, and
sale of both consumer data and advertising.46
Consumers, industry observers, and some government officials have
begun to reconsider their initial conclusion that the internet market structure always has a beneficial or benign impact on consumers and competition. Throughout the political spectrum, advocates seek regulatory and
even structural antitrust remedies for real or perceived harms.47 Such advocacy has triggered predictable pushback from incumbents and parties
content with the status quo and able to use case precedent, economic doctrine, and political ideology to support limited government oversight.48
Proponents of the status quo see no reason to abandon adherence to
the doctrine of limited government intervention in markets. They oppose
government’s intervention absent compelling evidence of direct harm to
consumers, such as increased prices.49 The so-called Chicago School of
45. “Surveillance capitalism operates through unprecedented asymmetries in
knowledge and the power that accrues to knowledge. Surveillance capitalists know
everything about us, whereas their operations are designed to be unknowable to us.
They accumulate vast domains of new knowledge from us, but not for us.”
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 11 (PublicAffairs 2019).
46. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014) (identifying
privacy harms to individuals caused by data mining and recommending a framework for redress).
47. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
118, 118 (2018) (“Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable moment in a
generation.”).
48. “Hipster Antitrust, or the ‘New Brandeis Movement,’ . . . proposes to divorce antitrust law from economic analysis, to abandon the well-established consumer welfare framework that introduced the rule of law to antitrust, and to
replace that standard with a vague and pliable socio-political approach.” Elyse
Dorsey, Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Hipster Antitrust Meets Public Choice
Economics: The Consumer Welfare Standard, Rule of Law, and Rent Seeking, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 21, 22, https://www.competi
tionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/AC_APRIL.pdf
[permalink unavailable].
Hipster Antitrust claims the consumer welfare standard invites excessive
corporate control over antitrust agencies and outcomes. Hipster Antitrust claims it would reduce corporate control over antitrust institutions
and their decision-making by relaxing the constraints imposed upon
them by the consumer welfare standard and simultaneously granting
them greater discretion under a broader, multi-factored public interest
test.
Id.
49. Joshua Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem
for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
293, 364–65 (2019) (repudiating all recent initiatives to replace Chicago School
doctrine).
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antitrust law and economics serves as the primary intellectual foundation
for assessing marketplace conditions. It provides an economically driven
template for assessing mergers and acquisitions in terms of their impact
on consumer welfare and marketplace efficiency.50 Robert H. Bork and
Ward S. Bowman identified the primary goals of antitrust as maximizing
efficiency and consumer welfare by emphasizing whether and how competition affects consumer prices.51 The model has evolved into a threetiered analysis:
First, both economists and courts ultimately settled upon the
same basic premise that antitrust laws are designed to promote
consumer welfare. . . . The principled answer that emerged was
competition’s ability to lower prices, increase output, enhance
quality and innovation—that is, to achieve consumer benefits. . . .
Second, the Chicago School insights led to the conclusion that
economic theory, empirical evidence, and the error-cost framework should guide antitrust enforcement decisions. . . .
Third, in assessing liability and establishing applicable standards,
courts should consider error costs. . . . In implementing any legal regime, courts face tradeoffs between false positives (Type I
errors) and false negatives (Type II errors). In the antitrust context, false positives equate to erroneously condemning procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct. . . . False negatives,
meanwhile, incorrectly allow anticompetitive conduct to persist,
but are likely to experience some amount of self-correction in
the long run.52
Using this template, incumbent firms offering free goods and services
surely enhance consumer welfare, even as markets become increasingly
concentrated. These firms also may harm consumers and marketplace
competition. Assuming the Chicago School model seeks to avoid both
false negatives and positives, it should follow that adherents to this model
would appreciate the need to assess both benefits and costs to consumers,
particularly in light of changed circumstances resulting from mergers of
internet firms and growing reliance on broadband networks.
This Article does not challenge the appropriateness of the Chicago
School antitrust model and its emphasis on consumer welfare assessment.
However, it does question the efficacy and accuracy of the model when
50. Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 271 (2017)
(characterizing Chicago School merger review as one that considers the transaction as having a benign or possibly favorable consumer impact in light of enhanced economies of scale and scope).
51. Robert Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965);
Ward Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965).
52. Wright et al., supra note 49, at 304–06 (footnotes omitted).
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applied to markets where platform intermediaries operate in a two-sided
market. The Article recommends refinements to the model so that it
identifies both benefits and costs to consumers in the internet marketplace. In this major sector of the economy, consumers must consent to
surveillance by intermediaries and other firms that collect, mine, collate,
analyze, and market data about consumer behavior. Such refined analysis
can provide empirical evidence likely to challenge unconditional conclusions that consumers only stand to benefit by participating in internet
markets.53
Current antitrust and public interest assessments of proposed mergers and acquisitions can generate false negatives concluding that further
market concentration would not harm consumers and competition. Inertia, intellectual intransigence, doctrinal purity, and politics appear to create incentives for maintaining the status quo. Rather than consider
whether changed circumstances warrant reassessment, some status quo adherents mock initiatives for change as romantic54 or trendy.55 While using
the key evaluative criterion of consumer welfare, these critics of new refinements may ignore empirical evidence that, if considered, would reduce estimates of net benefits to consumers.
II. INTERNET MARKETS DO NOT ALWAYS FIT WITHIN CONVENTIONAL
ANTITRUST ASSESSMENT MODELS
Antitrust enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well as reviewing
courts, typically assess proposed mergers and acquisitions with models emphasizing whether the transaction has direct or indirect market effects.
When a deal combines competitors, antitrust modeling characterizes the
transaction direction as horizonal, and potentially troublesome, because
the acquiring company buys out a competitor and increases its market
share. When a proposed merger combines companies operating in different segments of a market food chain, antitrust assessment frames the
transaction as vertical in direction, and therefore less worrisome,56 because the two companies did not compete against each other previously.
53. See Christopher Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics
of Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019) (questioning reliance on market forces to achieve optimal equilibrium between consumer
and seller interests).
54. See, e.g., Thibault Schrepel, Antitrust Without Romance, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 326 (2020).
55. See, e.g., Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust—A Brief Fling or Something More, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.competitionpoli
cyinternational.com/hipster-antitrust-a-brief-fling-or-something-more/ [https://
perma.cc/W8AN-MVVH].
56. See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J.
1962 (2018) (offering reasons why vertical merger enforcement is essential in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to entry barriers and market power).
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Internet markets and proposed mergers do not conveniently fit into
mutually exclusive vertical and horizontal market planes for several reasons. First, the prospective merging ventures already may have diversified
by buying or developing in-house the ability to serve many market elements in both vertical and horizontal segments. For example, even before
acquiring NBC Universal, Inc., Comcast had vertically integrated as a
video content creator, syndicator, packager, and retail distributor. The
company creates and packages video content as an owner or investor in
broadcast cable, television, and regional sports networks. It offers unaffiliated cable and satellite companies the opportunity to deliver this content
to their subscribers. Farther downstream on the vertical plane, the company has installed cable television distribution plants providing “last mile,”
broadband content access to its retail customers.
While vertically integrating throughout the video marketplace, Comcast also has diversified into adjacent markets offering competitive alternatives to its cable television option. The company provides wireless
broadband access to residential and business subscribers who can use this
infrastructure to access the same video content available via Comcast’s
cable television networks, but also competitive alternatives. Comcast operates in a multidimensional or 360-degree marketplace57 with an eye toward providing service bundles that combine video content it creates or
acquires, broadband access, wired and wireless telephone service, and security services. The company has diversified to shore up revenues that
may substantially decline as consumers pursue alternatives. As a fully integrated and diversified company, Comcast has multiple and diverse opportunities to generate revenues via several integrated markets.
When ventures integrate multidimensionally,58 a proposed merger or
acquisition may not fit solely within a single vertical or horizontal direction. Most major internet companies recognize the benefits in economies
of scope, including the opportunity to diversify into adjacent markets to
offset possible declines in revenue from core services. For example, one
of the key reasons for Comcast’s interest in acquiring NBC Universal, Inc.
lies in its forecasted need to respond to changing market conditions by
57. See Elizabeth Schéré, The Trouble with Mergers Is . . . , 25 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
133, 141 (2018) (explaining the Antitrust Division’s “horizontal relationship concerns” to the “traditional vertical merger” thus, exhibiting Comcast’s multidimensional marketplace concerns).
Though the Comcast-NBCU merger was vertical in essence, it did involve
some horizontal concerns since Comcast-NBCU would be competing with
online video distributors in the same relevant market (i.e., Netflix and
Hulu). If the merger had gone through without scrutiny from the Antitrust Division and the FCC, Comcast would have been able to limit competition by withholding content from online video services or stifle their
businesses by leveraging the content for higher prices.
Id. at 141–42.
58. See Brian J. Smith, Note, Vertical vs. Core Search: Defining Google’s Market in a
Monopolization Case, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS 331 (2012) (discussing complexity in defining the scope of internet search markets).
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owning more of the content it distributes and by relying less on cable television revenues that might decline as consumers eliminate (“cord cut”) or
reduce (“cord shave”) their monthly cable television bill.59 Comcast expects to benefit by reducing its content costs, particularly payments to unaffiliated ventures, and also to diversify revenue streams.
Economists use the term double marginalization to identify two profit
margins occurring when a firm acquires a good or service and subsequently resells it.60 One of the assumed benefits in a vertical merger or
acquisition lies in the elimination of the markup woven into the price previously paid by the acquiring firm that it no longer has to pay. For example, after acquiring NBC Universal, Inc., Comcast, in its capacity as a cable
television operator, no longer had to pay video carriage rights, including a
profit margin, for the video content NBC Universal, Inc., created, including NBC’s owned and operated broadcast television and cable networks,
such as CNBC and MSNBC.
When a venture such as Comcast diversifies throughout the internet
marketplace, it can improve the odds that it will remain profitable regardless of what mix of technologies and services consumers choose to
purchase. Ignoring the company’s overall business strategy and concentrating solely on its vertical or horizontal integration efforts ignores how
Comcast and other similarly situated firms have devised a sophisticated
and multifaceted strategy that responds to changing consumer
preferences.
Consider one of the key antitrust concerns in a proposed vertical
merger or acquisition: the potential for price discrimination, such as
charging competitors higher video content carriage fees with an eye toward rendering them less attractive in the marketplace. With Comcast’s
acquisition of NBC Universal, Inc., the potential exists for Comcast, as
content creator and distributor, to offer competitors access to “must see”
video networks on discriminatory terms and conditions. Conventional antitrust wisdom dismisses the likelihood of such a scenario. This is based on
the view that Comcast would lose revenue in light of customer defections
59. Drew FitzGerald, Cord-Cutting Hits AT&T Again While Wireless, Media Grow,
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cord-cutting-hits-at-tagain-while-wireless-media-grow-11563965519 [https://perma.cc/8JWN-752A] (reporting a loss of nearly one million subscribers in the second quarter of 2019).
60. Courts have defined double marginization as follows:
[D]ouble marginalization refers to the situation in which two different
firms in the same industry, but at different levels in the supply chain,
each apply their own markups (reflecting their own margins) in pricing
their products. . . . Those “stacked” margins are both incorporated in the
final price that consumers have to pay for the end product. . . . By vertically integrating two such firms into one, the merged company is able to
“shrink that total margin so there’s one instead of two,” leading to lower
prices for consumers.
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 197 (D.D.C. 2018) (citations
omitted) (quoting Transcript of Trial at 2252: 1–3 (Shapiro), AT&T, Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 3d at 197–98 (No. 17-2511 (RJL)), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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triggered by the company’s extraordinary price increases for access to its
content access or by refusing to carry popular content provided by an unaffiliated programmer. Without providing empirical proof, Chicago
School adherents assume that companies invariably suffer financially when
they unilaterally act in ways that reduce the value of their offerings or
unreasonably raise prices.61 Applying this assumption, Comcast immediately would lose revenues as a result of subscription cancellations of service
and possible migration from video services no longer able to offer “must
see” channels to options offering that content or acceptable substitutes.
Presumably, Comcast could not likely recoup lost revenues even for short
“blackout” periods when it failed to reach agreements with competing
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), e.g., cable television companies, such as Cox and Charter, as well as the direct broadcast
satellite companies DirecTV (AT&T) and Dish, for access to Comcastowned programming.
The conventional wisdom does not include scenarios where Comcast
could recoup some or all of its lost revenues as disgruntled subscribers
abandon the competing MVPD and migrate to one or more services offered by Comcast. In the multidimensional markets served by Comcast,
the company can attract current subscribers to an MVPD competitor by
offering a video-only service that includes the blacked-out channels, or
better yet, a bundle containing video, broadband, and telephone service.
Rather than losing money from an attempted price squeeze of an MVPD
competitor, Comcast stands to generate higher revenues by attracting
some of the MVPD’s current customers, angry at the lack of access to a
preferred network, and by offering them further financial inducements to
change carriers (“churn”) with a bundle of video, broadband, and telephone services.
The district court judge presiding over the Justice Department’s 2018
antitrust suit against AT&T’s $85 billion acquisition of Time Warner62 did
not deviate from the conventional wisdom about vertical integration having little risk to competition and consumers. Additionally, Judge Richard
J. Leon dismissed the potential for the acquisition to generate more
“blackouts” that occur when video programmers and distributors cannot
agree on new contract renewal terms and conditions.63
61. “Chicago School scholars further believed that firms cannot generally obtain or enhance monopoly power through unilateral action. This is because, in
most cases, firms would just preserve or gain market share at the expense of profits.” Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton & Filippo Maria Lancieri, The Chicago School’s
Limited Influence on International Antitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 (2020). “In
addition, antitrust law should not be concerned with attacking companies in monopolistic or oligopolistic industries when their size has been achieved by internal
growth, as larger firms are normally more efficient than smaller ones.” Id.
62. Id. at 161.
63. Video programmers and distributors increasingly miscalculate the value
of their contribution to the mutually beneficial delivery of content to consumers.
Recently, blackouts have occurred more frequently and for longer durations. See
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Judge Leon concluded that a content programmer or distributor,
such as AT&T, would rarely, if ever, financially gain by withholding content, even for a short period of time, in an attempt to extort higher prices
from an MVPD competitor for highly desired video content.64 The decision largely concentrated on assessing whether and how AT&T’s vertical
integration into content ownership could raise the cost of access by
MVPDs to Time Warner content now owned by AT&T. The court largely
ignored the potential for AT&T to raise both its broadband and MVPD
subscription rates65 to favor its content through zero rating,66 to raise consumer costs for accessing video content from an AT&T competitor, and to
promote bundled subscriptions combining its video content, telephone,
and internet access services.
The decision also failed to consider how changes in the video marketplace might prompt AT&T to consider and execute new blackout strategies. Instead of, or in addition to, withholding video content as leverage

Brad Adgate, TV Station Blackouts Are Accelerating; Here’s Why, FORBES (Nov. 12,
2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2019/11/12/tv-sta
tion-blackouts-are-accelerating-heres-why/#3ac0f3597f6c [https://perma.cc/
ZQL3-6G2F]; Tara Lachapelle, TV Blackouts Will Only Get Worse, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-27/tv
-blackouts-like-dish-hbo-will-only-get-worse [permalink unavailable] (reporting a
substantial spike in blackouts).
64. “Given that blackouts are negative events for both programmers and distributors, however, deals between programmers and distributors are invariably
struck in order to avoid long-term blackouts.” AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 200.
[G]iven that a post-merger Turner, like a pre-merger Turner, would
stand to suffer large losses in affiliate fee and advertising revenues in the
event of a blackout—the record is barren of any contentions by the thirdparty competitors that they would actually give in to any price increases
demanded by Turner as a result of its purported increase in post-merger
leverage.
Id. at 214. Judge Leon agreed with the defendant’s assertion that no single or
group of programming networks are so essential that their absence would render
the venture uncompetitive. “Based on the evidence, I agree with defendants that
Turner’s content is not literally ‘must have’ in the sense that distributors cannot
effectively compete without it. The evidence showed that distributors have successfully operated, and continue to operate, without the Turner networks or similar
programming.” Id. at 202.
65. Scott Moritz & Kamaron Leach, AT&T Hikes Online-TV Prices Up to 30% in
Second Boost This Year, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-10-18/at-t-hikes-online-tv-prices-up-to-30-in-second-boost-thisyear [permalink unavailable] (reporting rate increases in excess of 30%).
66. “ ‘Zero rating’ provides subscribers with cost-saving opportunities where
an ISP offers not to debit a subscriber’s monthly data allotment when she
downloads content originating from specific sources.” Rob Frieden, Freedom to Discriminate: Assessing the Lawfulness and Utility of Biased Broadband Networks, 20 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 655, 662 (2018); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Zero-Rating Broadband
Data: Equality and Free Speech at the Network’s Other Edge, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 63, 64
(2016) (explaining how broadband subscribers can conserve their monthly data
allowance because zero rating exempts specific content from metering).
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for higher compensation,67 AT&T might strategically use blackouts in its
capacity as an MVPD to reduce or eliminate increases in its substantial
program access costs, particularly for retransmission rights to local broadcast television stations.68 Under this scenario, AT&T would risk churn by
its subscribers frustrated by channel blackouts. However, the company
might consider this risk readily offset by savings in broadcast television
retransmission costs69 and possibly securing greater flexibility in deciding
into which service tiers and video on-demand options AT&T would offer
the most desired non-broadcast content, such as HBO.70 In 2019, MVPDs
paid an estimated $11.72 billion for local broadcast television stations’
consent to retransmit their content and $10.57 billion in 2018.71 These
amounts constitute a significant increase over the $9.3 billion paid in
2017, which represented 30% of total revenue.72
67. The Justice Department’s argued that “by combining Time Warner’s programming and DirecTV’s distribution, the merger would give Time Warner increased bargaining leverage in negotiations with rival distributors, leading to
higher, supracompetitive prices for millions of consumers.” United States v.
AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
68. “The Communications Act requires that a television station give its consent to a cable system or other multichannel video programming distributor
(MVPD) to carry its broadcast signal.” Retransmission Consent, FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/media/policy/retransmission-consent [https://
perma.cc/N5MJ-RDVT] (last updated Dec. 13, 2015).
Television stations and cable systems, as well as satellite carriers, negotiate
for this “retransmission consent” and money or other consideration is
generally exchanged between the parties in these private negotiations. If
the parties do not produce an agreement in time, they may decide to
extend the existing agreement, which means they would continue to
carry the stations during their negotiations. If they do not reach an
agreement, then the cable system or other MVPD must stop offering the
stations to their subscribers.
Id.; see 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51–70 (2019) (establishing, inter alia, MVPD must carry
duties and retransmission consent duties).
69. Edmund Lee, CBS Is Blacked Out for 6.5 Million AT&T Customers. Here’s
Why, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/business/
media/cbs-blackout-att.html?auth=forgot-password&referring_pv_id=0nEfIZhrUsrJvLzxVpRKwZcM [https://perma.cc/PT8Z-KJ5U] (reporting an attempt by
CBS in 2019 to increase retransmission consent compensation from AT&T by
50%).
70. “In addition to a smaller fee increase, AT&T is pushing for the ability to
sell CBS’s streaming service as a separate option, which could give it more flexibility and lower costs by potentially removing the channel from its basic bundle.” Id.
71. Adam Jacobson, Retransmission Consent Revenue: An 11% Growth Engine, RADIO & TELEVISION BUS. RPT. (July 30, 2019), https://www.rbr.com/retransmissionconsent-revenue-an-11-growth-engine/ [https://perma.cc/PT8Z-KJ5U].
72. Communications Marketplace Report, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 12,558, 12,615–16
(2018).
Many television broadcast stations generate revenue by granting MVPDs
the right to carry their signal. Pursuant to Section 325 of the Act, MVPDs
may not retransmit a local television broadcaster’s signal without the station’s express permission. If a station elects retransmission consent, the
broadcaster and MVPD negotiate a carriage agreement, which often includes monetary or other types of compensation to the television broad-
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In its complete rejection of the Government’s attempts to prove that
AT&T’s merger with Time Warner would substantially lessen competition,
the district court decision bolsters the existing, conventional view that vertical mergers do not likely harm competition, because the combining parties did not compete with each other in the first place.73 The decision
rejected all of the DOJ’s arguments that the merger would enable the
combined company to charge rivals and, in turn, consumers higher prices
than what a standalone Time Warner could have imposed. It also rejected
the contention that AT&T would attempt to stifle competition generated
by streaming video services, commonly referred to as virtual MVPDs,74
which offer video content via broadband links, or prevent rivals from using
HBO as a promotional tool to attract and retain subscribers.75
On the matter of AT&T having increased opportunities to leverage
access to “must see” video content, the decision noted that no other antitrust trials have validated the likelihood of success in strategies designed to
extort high carriage fees by leveraging access to the most desirable networks.76 Judge Leon concluded “that the Government has failed to clear
the first hurdle of showing that the proposed merger is likely to increase
Turner’s bargaining leverage [over access to CNN, HBO, and other most
desired content] in affiliate negotiations . . . .”77 Therefore, the court did
not even have to consider whether and how the merger would result in a
caster. In 2016 and 2017, respectively, broadcasters earned about 25% of
their revenue ($7.9 billion) and 30% of their revenue ($9.3 billion) from
retransmission consent fees.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. “[T]he proposed transaction between AT & T and Time Warner is a vertical merger—i.e., one that involves ‘firms that do not operate in the same market’
and thus ‘produce[s] no immediate change in the level of concentration in any
relevant market.’ ” United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 192 (D.D.C.
2018) (second alteration in original) (quoting DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.0 (June 14, 1984)), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
74. “I conclude that the Government has failed to meet its burden on its
claims arising from AT & T’s asserted potential to unilaterally harm virtual MVPDs
through its post-merger control of Turner content.” Id. at 245–46.
75. “The Government has failed to meet its burden of proof on this theory for
two independent reasons.” Id. at 250. “First, the Government has failed to show
that the merged entity would have any incentive to foreclose rivals’ access to HBObased promotions. This is because the Government’s promotion-withholding theory conflicts with HBO’s business model, which remains ‘heavily dependent’ on
promotion by distributors.” Id. at 250–51. “Second, the Government fails to establish that HBO promotions are so valuable that withholding or restricting them will
drive customers to AT & T. Put differently, the Government has failed to show that
the marketplace substitutes for HBO are ‘inferior, inadequate, or more costly.’ ”
Id. at 251 (footnote omitted) (quoting Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United
States at ¶ 62, AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (No. 17-2511 (RJL)).
76. “Indeed, the Government has not pointed to any prior trials in federal
district court in which the Antitrust Division has successfully used this increasedleverage theory to block a proposed vertical merger as violative of Section 7.” Id. at
199.
77. Id.
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substantial lessening of competition, the evaluative criterion required by
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.78
The decision emphasized the assumption that content providers will
not use blackouts to gain a negotiation advantage, because they cannot
possibly profit from such a strategy. Judge Leon failed to recognize both
the customary course of content carriage disputes when consumers have
limited alternatives to the blacked-out content and the impact of new
broadband-mediated options. Before the introduction of consumer video
streaming options, using broadband access for so-called Over the Top
(OTT)79 applications and Internet Protocol Television, MVPDs typically
“blinked first” and accepted content carriage rate increases. At that time,
MVPDs could pass through rate increases to subscribers who had few competitive alternatives for accessing expensive, “must see” sporting events80
and other “live” content. For example, many past broadcast television retransmission disputes often got resolved just as the National Football
League transitioned to the regular season.81
According to Judge Leon’s assessment of the video content marketplace, one should consider new OTT options as further reducing any upside financial benefits for programmers from pursuing a backout strategy
as leverage for extracting higher compensation at contract renewal time.
Presumably, OTT alternatives to cable television would offer highly desired and currently blacked-out content, thereby diminishing the
programmer’s leverage.
Despite growing evidence of dissatisfaction with expensive, large bundles of video channels, and migration to OTT options,82 the vast majority
of video consumers still subscribe to an incumbent cable or satellite
78. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
79. “Over-the-top VoIP [Voice over Internet Protocol] [and other] services
require the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top [services] can vary in terms of the extent to
which they rely on their own facilities.” Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband
Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17,905, 17,916 n.48 (2010), vacated sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
80. Josh Mathews, Comment, Sports Broadcasting Blackouts: A Harbinger of
Change in a Rapidly Evolving Media Landscape?, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 202, 203
(2018) (reporting that pay television consumers pay approximately 15% of their
cable bill for sports programming, regardless of whether they consume the product or not).
81. Dom DiFurio, AT&T, CBS End 20-Day Blackout in Time for NFL’s Start. But
Is Losing Channels the New Normal for Pay TV Customers?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
(Aug. 8, 2019, 10:08 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/local-companies
/2019/08/08/att-cbs-end-20-day-blackout-in-time-for-nfl-s-start-but-is-losing-chan
nels-the-new-normal-for-pay-tv-customers/ [https://perma.cc/7SD6-XQBG].
82. Sapna Maheshwari & John Koblin, Why Traditional TV Is in Trouble, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/media/
television-advertising.html [https://perma.cc/Q5S9-HLKL] (reporting ratings decline for broadcast television, especially among young video consumers).
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MVPD.83 Some content networks have refrained from providing the most
desirable content to OTT streaming services. Instead, they permit alternative on-demand access via wired and wireless broadband only for existing
MVPD subscribers who must authenticate their accounts before accessing
video content via alternative, broadband delivery options. Additionally,
not many of the OTT streaming service providers offer access to local television stations affiliated with one of the major live, broadcast networks.84
Most new OTT video providers offer on-demand, “non-linear” access
to original programming.85 Consumers may gladly abandon linear “appointment television”86 in exchange for access anytime, anywhere, via any
device, and in multiple video presentation formats.
New designations, such as cord cutting and cord shaving, refer to the
growing number of video consumers who abandon an MVPD subscription
or incur lower monthly rates by downgrading to a less expensive service
tier containing fewer channels. The term “cord nevers” refers to young
video consumers who never had to pay monthly recurring costs for content access. This increasingly influential group, to both content providers
and advertisers, appears less willing to consider linear television more desirable vis-à-vis less expensive, or advertiser subsidized, non-linear
content.87
83. Despite the success of Amazon Prime, Netflix, and Hulu, the vast majority
of consumers continue to subscribe to cable, satellite, or telephone company
MVPD. Of the ninety-four million video subscribers in 2017, cable served 51.9
million, DBS served 31.5 million, and telephone companies served 10.6 million.
Commc’ns Marketplace Report, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 12,558, 12,625 fig.6-b (2018). Virtual MVPDs, which provide similar programming via a broadband link, had a total
market share of only 4.8 million subscribers, while Amazon Prime reached 55.4
million and Netflix 52.8 million. Id.
84. AT&T, Dish Network, Hulu, and YouTube TV offer live, broadcast network content. See, e.g., HULU, https://www.hulu.com/live-tv [https://perma.cc/
3QUM-B7LT] (last visited May 21, 2020).
85. “Viewership through an OTT provider bypasses the traditional TV distributors because the subscriber receives content over the Internet instead of through
a set-top box provided by the cable company.” Cal Keating, Comment, “Over the
Top” or “Over the Heads” of Sports Broadcasting? Sports and Entertainment Content Licensing and Distribution in a New Era, 25 SPORTS LAW. J. 177, 181 (2018).
The OTT marketplace is competitive, innovative, personalized, and undeniably chaotic at this juncture as it continues to grow into its own and
cater to the market demands of individual consumers: presenting the opportunity to forego the bundling dilemma and subscribe to individual TV
network channels or access content in an a-la-carte manner.
Id.
86. “Traditional subscription television providers have come to rely most on
live content—particularly sports—to retain customers. Channels showing popular
live sports have been relatively safe from this trend away from subscription television—sports content is generally considered ‘appointment television,’ which consumers insist on watching as it happens.” James Rickard, Note, Going Live: The Role
of Automation in the Expeditious Removal of Online Content, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2171, 2175
(2016).
87. Daniel Frankel, Cord-Cutting Got 75% Worse in Q1, Most Terrible Quarter Ever
for Pay TV, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://www.multichannel.com/
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AT&T can execute different types of profit maximizing strategies having combined new video content ownership with preexisting video delivery services. In lieu of attempting to raise the price of access to video
content by MVPDs and risking harmful blackouts financially harming both
AT&T and MVPDs, AT&T could execute a different blackout strategy in its
capacity as a major vertically integrated MVPD. It could refuse demands
for higher compensation from other video programming sources, such as
local broadcast television stations the company retransmits via its DirecTV
satellites and its U-verse terrestrial broadband networks. Under this scenario, the availability of alternative access to broadcast networks via OTT services may threaten AT&T’s MVPD revenues but also provide some
consumers with “self-help” options via AT&T broadband network options
for accessing desirable content, such as broadcast networks, during the
blackout. Such alternative access might reduce incentives for AT&T to
“blink first” and agree to higher retransmission rates, which Judge Leon
identified as standard procedure.88
A quite plausible reason for AT&T to tolerate longer blackouts postmerger stems from the greater likelihood that it would have steady or increasing revenues from the wired and wireless broadband internet access
it provides consumers for accessing OTT streaming services.89 Judge Leon
refused to consider whether ventures such as AT&T, which operates in
multidimensional markets, would have more incentives to “hang tough”
and tolerate prolonged blackouts in its capacity as both a programmer and
MVPD. While considering the onset of robust competition from new
broadband-delivered video services as evidence AT&T could not successfully pursue price gouging or blackouts, the judge even refused to consider two alternative financial safety valves available to help AT&T tolerate
short-term revenue losses triggered by blackouts.
After having received approval to acquire Time Warner, AT&T has
opted to raise subscriber costs for all of its video services.90 Additionally,
news/cord-cutting-got-75-percent-worse-in-q1 [https://perma.cc/8G6Z-WHC9]
(estimating an annual decline of 4.8% in pay television viewership).
88. Judge Leon highlighted AT&T’s propensity to balk at higher retransmission rates and stated:
Because blackouts are almost always negative events for both programmers and distributors, ‘at the end of the day . . . [t]here’s no benefit for
anyone to walk away’ without an affiliate agreement. Therefore, bargains
between programmers and distributors are almost always struck in order
to avoid long-term blackouts.
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 172 (D.D.C. 2018) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
89. John Eggerton, AT&T: Locast Is Option If There Is CBS Blackout, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (July 19, 2019), https://www.multichannel.com/news/at-t-locastis-option-if-there-is-cbs-blackout [https://perma.cc/C77B-A3SN] (reporting
AT&T’s tough retransmission consent negotiation posture).
90. See Sarah Perez, AT&T to Revamp DirecTV Now with New Plans Bundling in
HBO, Price Hikes, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 11, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://techcrunch.
com/2019/03/11/att-to-revamp-directv-now-with-new-plans-bundling-in-hbo-pricehikes/ [https://perma.cc/5A43-H4MK]; Chris Welch, AT&T Confirms Drastic
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the company has evidenced a greater tolerance for geographically widespread and longer lasting blackouts of local broadcast television channels.91 The National Association of Broadcasters reported that AT&T and
Dish were responsible for 82% of all blackouts occurring from
2015–2019.92
As a multidimensional market participant, AT&T can develop profitmaximizing strategies both for downstream access of content it owns, such
as HBO and CNN, and for unowned content it pays to retransmit, such as
local broadcast network affiliates. Having the safety valves provided by
growing broadband revenues and its two MVPD options, AT&T can consider raising the cost for distribution rights of its “must see” content while
becoming more price-sensitive and aggressive in retransmission negotiations for content it does not own. Consumers increasingly can access this
content without a cable or satellite television subscription. They do so using broadband access to OTT streaming video options, or substitute with
non-linear, on-demand options. Additionally, urban and suburban residents can use antennas to receive most local broadcast television stations
without any paid subscription.93
Judge Leon dismissed as implausible94 the Government’s theory that
a combined AT&T and Time Warner would accrue more opportunities to
Changes to DirecTV Now and Raises Cheapest Plan to $50, VERGE (Mar. 13, 2019, 10:48
AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/13/18263839/att-directv-now-2019channel-changes-hbo-plan-price [permalink unavailable].
91. Ben Munson, AT&T Declines Deal to Keep Local Channels on DirecTV, U-verse,
Nexstar Claims, FIERCE VIDEO (July 8, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://www.fiercevideo.
com/video/at-t-declines-deal-to-keep-local-channels-directv-u-verse [https://
perma.cc/UYY7-MXQ3] (reporting the loss of 120 broadcast television stations in
ninety-seven markets when AT&T and Nexstar failed to reach closure on a new
retransmission consent contract).
92. Allow Broadcasters to Continue Negotiating in the Free Market, NAT’L ASS’N
BROADCASTERS, https://www.nab.org/advocacy/issue.asp?id=1891&issueid=1008
[https://perma.cc/X4H9-HS2B] (last visited May 21, 2020). A major blackout
with CBS and Nexstar lasted for up to fifty-seven days. Kelly Tyko, AT&T, Nexstar
End Eight-Week Dispute, Channels Returning to DirecTV, U-Verse and AT&T TV, USA
TODAY (Aug. 29, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/
08/29/at-t-nexstar-dispute-ends-stations-returning-directv-u-verse/2156291001/
[https://perma.cc/A5B5-HMD2]; see also Dade Hayes, CBS Stations Go Dark on
DirecTV, U-Verse in AT&T Contract Dispute—Update, DEADLINE (July 20, 2019, 6:35
AM), https://deadline.com/2019/07/cbs-blackout-directv-u-verse-att-contract-dispute-1202649633/ [https://perma.cc/P34U-DM5P]; Nexstar and AT&T Statement
on New Distribution Agreement, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190829005762/en/Nexstar-ATT-State
ment-New-Distribution-Agreement [https://perma.cc/ZE4D-9RBH].
93. See Receiving Broadcast TV Stations Dropped from Pay TV Service, FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/receiving-broadcasttv-stations-dropped-pay-tv-service [https://perma.cc/W9YZ-FYEG].
94. Judge Leon apparently did not know that video carriage blackouts are
increasing in both number and duration. See, e.g., TV Blackouts Skyrocket in 2019,
Making It Worst Year Ever, AM. TELEVISION ALL. (July 17, 2019), https://
www.americantelevisionalliance.org/tv-blackouts-skyrocket-in-2019-making-it-worstyear-ever/ [https://perma.cc/3ND7-LNE9].
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leverage concessions and higher compensation from rival MVPDs. The
judge based this conclusion on the assumption that AT&T would not, or
could not, successfully deviate from Time Warner’s prior track record evidencing an inclination to avoid anything more than a brief blackout of
cable network access.
It appears that the judge could not anticipate any scenario where
AT&T would be in a better position than a standalone Time Warner to
offset losses. Evidence presented at the trial showed how AT&T could attract customers migrating from a rival MVPD to one of the available AT&T
options still providing access to CNN and other blacked-out content. Additionally, AT&T broadband revenues could increase when subscribers of
a rival MVPD migrate to OTT, streaming services via an AT&T wired or
wireless network.
The judge largely discredited testimony from MVPD competitors of
AT&T about the absolute necessity in having HBO, CNN, and other Turner Network content available to subscribers.95 Additionally, he opted to
dismiss as insignificant previous assertions made by the defendants that
vertical integration threatened competition and consumers, because such
statements were made in the context of FCC regulatory proceedings when
AT&T and DirecTV were pursuing their interests as content distributors.
While AT&T and DirectTV opposed the Comcast-NBCUniversal merger as
anticompetitive and likely to raise content carriage prices for rival MVPDs,
Judge Leon saw no applicability of such advocacy now, particularly for supporting the Government’s increased-leverage theory. He differentiated an
FCC public interest assessment from an antitrust court review and also
dismissed the matter in its entirety by considering the video marketplace
as vastly more competitive in 2018 than when Comcast sought to vertically
integrate in 2011:
[D]efendants’ specific predictions regarding the ability of a
merged Comcast-NBCU to leverage price increases by threatening to withhold the particular programming at issue is not particularly probative of whether a merged AT&T-Time Warner could
do the same with its programming in today’s more competitive
marketplace.96
Judge Leon accepted the testimony of AT&T’s expert witnesses asserting that vertically integrated video content firms have not evidenced an
enhanced ability to raise rivals’ content prices, notwithstanding assertions
made by actual competitors that such practices are commonplace. Addi95. “Based on the evidence, I agree with defendants that Turner’s content is
not literally ‘must have’ in the sense that distributors cannot effectively compete
without it. The evidence showed that distributors have successfully operated, and
continue to operate, without the Turner networks or similar programming.”
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 202 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
96. Id. at 206–07.
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tionally, the judge accepted the allegation that, in actual fee negotiations,
MVPDs do not consider the identity of a programmer’s owner as a significant factor,97 or that vertically integrated firms have a newfound incentive
to threaten video distributors with long-term blackouts, based on greater
upside financial gains from maintaining an aggressive negotiating posture.98 The court also disagreed with the Government’s estimate of how
many MVPD subscribers would migrate to an AT&T option in the event of
a long-term blackout or above-average rate increase.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, despite having identified a significant—and arguably serious—mistake in the analysis.99 The appellate court held that the lower court did
not clearly err in finding that the government failed to show that the proposed merger would violate the Clayton Act. The appellate court accepted the lower court’s unquantified assessment that the video
marketplace operated with sufficient competition to diminish any increased bargaining leverage AT&T would have after acquiring Time
Warner. Curiously, the appellate court validated as probative some “real
world” testimony that vertically integrating firms did not subsequently
lower their rates, but agreed with the district court that sworn FCC filings
about future harms in other vertical mergers were not significant. The
appellate court also accepted the lower court’s rejection of assertions that
AT&T would execute more and different strategies to maximize profits.
Perhaps most important of all, the appellate court placed great emphasis on AT&T’s offer to seek “baseball style” arbitration of its content
access disputes with MVPDs for seven years100 and the existence of contracts that locked in content carriage rates until 2021. Baseball style arbitration maintains the status quo during negotiations, thereby foreclosing
blackouts of AT&T-owned content networks, and long-term content carriage contracts prevent near-term rate increases.
97. Id. at 222.
98. Id. at 249.
99. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
It is true that the district court misstated that the government had not
proven that any price increases would ‘outweigh the conceded $350 million in annual cost saving to AT&T’s customers.’ . . . Professor Shapiro
testified that the merger would result in $352 million cost savings to
AT&T and that not all those savings would be passed on to consumers.
The $352 million, therefore, was not cost savings to consumers but to
AT&T.
Id. (citation omitted).
100. “Turner Broadcasting ‘irrevocably offer[ed]’ approximately 1,000 distributors agreements to engage in baseball style arbitration in the event the parties
fail to reach a renewal agreement, and the offered agreement guarantees no blackout of Turner Broadcasting content once arbitration is invoked. AT&T’s counsel
represented the no-blackout commitment is ‘legally enforceable’ . . . .” Id. at 1035
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). “Consequently, the government’s challenges to the district court’s treatment of its economic theories becomes largely
irrelevant, at least during the seven-year period.” Id.
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The appellate court also glossed over Judge Leon’s assumption that
AT&T would pass through all savings accruing from owning, rather than
having to mark up prices paid for content acquired from a non-affiliate.
Accepting the accuracy of this $352 million savings juxtaposes with the
spate of post-acquisition AT&T rate increases101 and the appellate court’s
general skepticism about other forecasted higher costs to consumers identified by the DOJ’s expert witnesses.102 The appellate court did note that
Judge Leon incorrectly assumed that all of AT&T’s estimated $352 million
video programming cost savings would flow to subscribers, but dismissed
that error as “harmless” because the court agreed with the lower court that
DOJ had failed to prove that AT&T would be able to raise customer rates
at all,103 despite FCC statistics confirming yearly increases in subscription
rates well above general inflation measures.104
Since its acquisition of Time Warner, AT&T has raised DirecTV, Uverse and HBO subscription rates significantly105 despite unprecedented
declines in subscribership.106 The company also has leveraged access to
101. “AT&T Inc. is hiking prices on its pay TV services for the second time
since January, even after telling a judge during the U.S. antitrust trial last year that
prices would go down if it was allowed to buy Time Warner Inc.” Todd Shields,
David McLaughlin, & Scott Moritz, DirecTV to Hike Prices After Owner AT&T Promised
Cheaper Bills, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-03-14/directv-to-hike-prices-after-owner-at-t-promised-cheaperbills [permalink unavailable].
102. “Neither Professor Shapiro’s opinion testimony nor his quantitative
model considered the effect of the post-litigation offer of arbitration agreements
. . . .” AT&T Inc., 916 F.3d at 1046.
103. “The $352 million, therefore, was not cost savings to consumers but to
AT&T.” Id. at 1046.
But the district court did not weigh increased prices for consumers
against cost savings for consumers, and instead found that the government had not shown at the first level that the merger was likely to lead to
any price increases for consumers because of the failure to show that
costs for rival MVPDs would increase as a result of Turner Broadcasting’s
increased leverage in affiliate negotiations after the merger.
Id. at 1046–47.
104. See, e.g., Report on Cable Indus. Prices, Implementation of Section 3 of
the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report
on Average Rates for Basic Serv., Cable Programming Serv., and Equip. (2018)
(MM Docket No. 92-266), https://www.fcc.gov/document/report-average-ratescable-programming-service-and-equipment-5 [https://perma.cc/ZXL8-9HPR] (reporting an average 4.4% cable television rate increase compared to a 1.4% increase in the Consumer Price Index).
105. See, e.g., Karl Bode, AT&T Jacks Up TV Prices Again After Merger, Despite
Promising That Wouldn’t Happen, VICE (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:21 AM), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/eve8kj/atandt-jacks-up-tv-prices-again-after-mergerdespite-promising-that-wouldnt-happen [https://perma.cc/SV2B-FA4J].
106. Jon Brodkin, AT&T to Lose 1.1 Million TV Subscribers as DirecTV Continues
Nosedive, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 12, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://arstechnica.com/infor
mation-technology/2019/09/att-expects-to-lose-another-1-1-million-tv-subscribersthis-quarter/ [https://perma.cc/3YJN-QJPC].
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HBO consistent with the DOJ’s prediction that AT&T would bundle HBO
with subscriptions to other less desired channels.107
III. ANTITRUST MERGER REVIEW EMPHASIS ON SHORT-TERM CONSUMER
WELFARE CAN FAIL TO IDENTIFY COUNTERVAILING HARMS
Regulatory agencies and courts reviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions properly concentrate on how the transaction will affect consumers and competition. Whenever possible, reviewers should use empirical
and quantifiable data to support their assessment and to take every possible step to avoid politicizing the process or biasing the review with nonempirical assumptions about how markets work.108 Antitrust enforcement
agency staff need to appreciate the harm they can impose on consumers
with either a false positive, that might reject or unfairly condition a benign
merger, and a false negative, that finds no harm even though damage is
apparent when using properly calibrated market assessment tools. Simply
put, antitrust enforcement agencies should not forget longstanding lessons about markets, or refrain from learning new ones,109 occasioned by
changed circumstances and the particular market conditions under which
internet ventures operate.
The potential for false positives and negatives increases in internet
markets, particularly ones where intermediaries operate in a two-sided
marketplace. Platform operators can appear to offer consumers “free” service because no direct monetary payment is required. Consistent with the
adage that “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” the so-called free service does trigger a number of transactions quite valuable to the intermediary and potentially costly to consumers.
A singular emphasis on short-term consumer welfare may render antitrust authorities oblivious to all applicable costs and benefits in transactions that a market consolidating firm would undertake. Such a flawed
analysis likely fails to consider impacts both downstream to consumers and
upstream to vendors of goods and services, data analytic companies, data
brokers,110 and advertisers. In many transactions, the readily observable
107. See Ashley Rodriguez, AT&T’s Streaming-TV Service Is Now Forcing You to
Buy HBO, QUARTZ (Mar. 13, 2019), https://qz.com/1572543/atts-directv-now-is-ba
sically-forcing-you-to-buy-hbo/ [https://perma.cc/6VDC-2D77].
108. Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
1527, 1528 (2011) (criticizing Chicago School antitrust analysis on its assumption
of rational self-interested market participants operating market with perfect
willpower).
109. Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for
Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 241–42 (2012) (promoting the superiority of empirical models over theoretical ones for assessing market impacts
from mergers).
110. See Laura Palk & Krishnamurty Muralidhar, A Free Ride: Data Brokers’ Rent
Seeking Behavior and the Future of Data Inequality, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779
(2018); Ashley Kuempel, Comment, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for
Reform of the Data Broker Industry, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207 (2016).
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and quantifiable enhancements to consumer welfare are at least partially
offset by less easily detected and quantified upstream data mining opportunities. Both consumers and antitrust enforcement agencies may not
know the length and breadth of such permissible activities because of nondisclosure agreements and the fact that the intermediary can contract with
many different types of upstream ventures whose identity and activities can
be obscured and not disclosed.
To make matters worse, some antitrust enforcement agencies appear
disinclined to consider upstream activities as having any significant and
measurable impact on consumers. Merger reviewers appear unable or unwilling to appreciate that transactions occurring upstream between an intermediary and an unaffiliated firm can have both direct and indirect
impacts on downstream consumers. Alternatively, they may overemphasize the zero direct payment characteristic of the transaction and discount
or ignore the countervailing effects of data mining and commercial
surveillance.
Even the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of upstream
activities on the overall value proposition of two-sided market transactions.
In Ohio v. American Express,111 a majority of the Court considered the positive effects of interrelated, multiple transactions on some consumers having such a favorable impact as to offset a related adverse impact. This case
assessed the potential for harmful effects of a vertical restraint imposed by
contractual terms imposed by American Express on all vendors agreeing
to accept the company’s credit card.
The Court acknowledged the direct harms of contractual language
barring vendors from steering customers to a different credit card with
lower “swipe fees” on the vendors, a savings that might flow in part to
consumers. The Court considered whether offsetting benefits to consumers existed and found them by noting how American Express used swipe
fee revenues to underwrite benefits to its credit card users, including extensive travel services. Arguably, if the Supreme Court supports a consumer impact analysis on both sides of a platform intermediary’s market to
prevent a false positive of harm to consumers, then courts—and by extension agencies with antitrust jurisdiction—should use this more inclusive
analysis to prevent a false negative. If the Supreme Court’s conservative
majority can embrace new economic doctrine supporting more robust and
complete analysis of consumer impacts occurring on both sides of an intermediary’s market, then other reviewing courts and antitrust enforcement agencies should do so as well.
Alternatively, reviewers might overestimate the benefits accruing from
such transactions, particularly ones that can occur when an acquiring firm
vertically integrates and internalizes transactions that possibly could generate benefits to consumers. For example, both courts reviewing AT&T’s
111. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2017); see also Frieden, Two-Sided Internet Markets, supra
note 43 (offering extensive analysis of the case).
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acquisition of Time Warner dismissed as largely irrelevant whether AT&T
would pass on to its subscribers any of the estimated $352 million in programming cost savings resulting from the elimination of double marginalization of Time Warner content. AT&T’s expert witnesses referred to
conventional economic doctrine that anticipates efficiency gains and cost
savings when an acquiring firm can eliminate having to pay a markup for
an essential good or service that a merger or acquisition would bring inhouse. Before acquiring Time Warner, when AT&T secured distribution
rights for content, such as HBO and CNN, Time Warner could include a
profit margin that AT&T would have to pay. Subsequently, AT&T itself
would factor in a second profit margin markup when pricing MVPD services to its retail subscribers.
Conventional economic doctrine notes that mergers and acquisitions
can eliminate one of the two markups (double marginalization)—because
AT&T would own the content programmer—rather than having to pay an
unaffiliated venture carriage fees that included a profit margin. Without
explaining how and why, Judge Leon accepted the estimate of AT&T’s
expert witness that the eliminated margin would generate a $352 million
savings, and this entire amount would flow through from AT&T to its subscribers, presumably by way of reduced monthly fees.112
It should come as no surprise that after receiving authorization to
complete its acquisition of Time Warner, AT&T did not reduce rates at all,
but in fact raised the cost of its “must see” HBO content on a standalone
basis and used it as an inducement for bundling video, broadband, and
wireless services.113
IV. CONSUMER WELFARE ASSESSMENT REQUIRES EMPIRICISM
AND QUANTIFICATION
Assessing the impact of mergers on consumers and competition requires a forward-looking projection of consumer and marketplace impacts
with reference to backward-looking, historical data. Antitrust enforcement agencies willingly consider qualitative factors that can corroborate
preexisting philosophical, political, theoretical, legal, and economic doctrine that may affect future market impact assessments. In a worst-case
scenario, these non-quantitative factors can undermine or substitute for
empirical findings, going so far as to discount obvious instances of market
concentration and the impact of nonpecuniary burdens on subscribers of
“free” internet-delivered services.
112. “All told, those savings to AT&T customers add up to $352 million annually. Those savings, moreover, would begin flowing to AT&T’s customers ‘pretty
quickly’ after consummation of the merger.” United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 3d 161, 198 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting AT&T expert witness), aff’d, 916 F.3d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
113. Perez, supra note 90 (reporting new AT&T strategies to raise prices and
leverage access to HBO to entice streaming subscribers).
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Some advocates who support ever-concentrating markets dismiss
quantitative measurements of increased market consolidation as irrelevant. Non-quantified arguments, such as efficiency and competition enhancing, subordinate findings of severe market concentration. For
example, proponents of the Sprint and T-Mobile merger urged antitrust
authorities to ignore the reduction in the total number of facilities-based
wireless competitors, resulting in a commensurately higher measures of
market concentration. They favored replacing quantified data with nonquantifiable arguments that a combination of the third and fourth national wireless carriers would foster more robust competition, help the
United States maintain or reclaim global supremacy over fifth generation
wireless technology, and expedite the rollout of cutting-edge service to rural locales thereby ending a digital divide with better served urban locations.114 These merger advocates succeeded in promoting institutional
amnesia of old and emerging lessons about the likely forward-looking impacts of mergers and acquisitions.115
The internet marketplace has the potential for generating new and
important lessons for regulators and antitrust reviewing courts. A combination of factors promotes this likelihood as no other industrial segment
offers so many free services, even as many market segments are dominated
by one or two firms. Few would dismiss the potential for dominant internet firms, operating highly popular platforms in a two-sided market, to
exploit positive networking externalities and economies of scale and
scope. One does not have be an emotional populist, contrarian, revolutionary, or socialist to consider antitrust review in need for significant finetuning.
A.

Caution in Concluding Market Mutual Exclusivity and Noncompeting
Merger Candidates

Internet mergers and acquisitions can have profound future impacts
on markets currently deemed unlikely to ever support competition between acquiring and acquired firms. Conventional doctrine about vertically integrated mergers and acquisitions supports a strong bias in favor of
approval largely based on the perception that the combining firms do not
compete because they operate in unrelated markets. The FTC’s 2007 approval of Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick embraced this rationale.116
A majority of FTC commissioners concluded that Google’s acquisition
of DoubleClick would have no significant impact on the advertising mar114. T-Mobile & Sprint, Creating a 5G Future for All, https://newtmobile.com/
[https://perma.cc/WQH2-HYMT] (last visited May 21, 2020) (touting the consumer benefits in the proposed merger of T-Mobile and Sprint).
115. See Edmund Lee & Katie Benner, U.S. Approves T-Mobile-Sprint Merger, a
Deal That Would Reshape the Industry, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/07/26/business/media/sprint-tmobile-merger.html [https://
perma.cc/KKS5-MZTL].
116. See FTC APPROVAL OF DOUBLECLICK ACQUISITION, supra note 35.
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ketplace, including segments that involve the internet for direct links to
advertising recipients,117 indirect links via advertising platform intermediaries,118 techniques for identifying candidate audiences,119 selling
unfilled opportunities to make commercial pitches,120 and auctioning off
advertising space on web pages.121 These commissioners summarily concluded that internet advertising segments are mutually exclusive with
Google and DoubleClick serving separate and noncompeting segments.122
The FTC decision first differentiated internet advertising provided via
Google as an intermediary versus the direct sales of advertising by content
providers:
The evidence in this case shows that advertisers buy online advertising space from both search engine providers, like Google, and
content providers (referred to as publishers in the online advertising business). However, the evidence in this case shows that
the advertising space sold by search engines is not a substitute for
space sold directly or indirectly by publishers or vice versa. Or, to
put it in terms of merger analysis, the evidence shows that the
sale of search advertising does not operate as a significant constraint on the prices or quality of other online advertising sold
directly or indirectly by publishers or vice versa.123
The FTC expressed absolute confidence that Google, as an “ad intermediary,”124 did not compete with direct sellers of advertising such as
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 8 (concluding “the evidence shows that even a significant increase
in ad serving costs would be unlikely to cause an increase in the number of ads
delivered through intermediaries”).
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id. at 11–12.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 12–13.
123. Id. at 3. “The evidence shows that ad intermediation is not a substitute
for publishers and advertisers who place display ads into directly acquired ad inventory or vice versa. (In other words, ad intermediaries placing ads indirectly do
not significantly constrain the pricing or quality of ads placed directly, or vice
versa.).” Id. at 4. “Publishers with direct sales forces are able to charge prices
several times higher for directly sold ad inventory than for inventory filled by ad
intermediation providers, and those publishers rely on publisher side ad serving to
place ads into that premium inventory.” Id.
124. The FTC identifies two intermediation market products: ad networks
and ad exchanges.
Ad networks and ad exchanges are alike in that they both aggregate advertising inventory. Ad networks are intermediaries that aggregate or
purchase advertising inventory from a group of websites and sell this inventory to advertisers or ad agencies, taking a share of the revenue from
each sale. Ad exchanges differ in that they aggregate inventory by providing platforms for advertisers and publishers to list and bid for inventory.
The evidence shows that the market in which ad networks and ad exchanges compete is relatively nascent, dynamic, and highly fragmented.
Id. at 5.
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newspapers, magazines, broadcast television networks and stations, cable
television networks, and MVPDs. While the Commission correctly may
have perceived the internet advertising marketplace in 2007, direct and
indirect advertising have become quite interlinked and competitive as evidenced by the massive decline in direct advertising revenues and the commensurate substantial increase in revenues and market share accrued by
Google and Facebook.125 These two firms accounted for approximately
72.1% of all internet-delivered advertising, with Google generating 50%
and Facebook generating 22.1% in 2018, representing $53.8 billion and
$23.7 in revenues respectively.126 Severe declines in revenues by direct
sellers of advertising raise questions about their future commercial
viability.
The FTC bolstered its conclusion that advertising intermediaries do
not compete with direct sellers by stating that intermediaries do not match
the effectiveness of more expensive direct advertising even with the use of
“targeting technology” that can match advertisers with audiences more
likely to respond favorably to specific commercial pitches.127 Even as it
acknowledged Google’s AdSense subsidiary as “a leading provider of contextual [intermediary delivered] advertising,”128 the FTC concluded that
Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick would not bolster the company’s
overall market share of the “broader ad intermediation market . . . [because] DoubleClick does not provide contextual advertising, and it does
not currently act as an intermediary.”129
The FTC majority sought to characterize the online advertising marketplace as comprising several separate segments with companies exclusively targeting just one or two segments. By concluding that it did not
have to assess the Google-DoubleClick acquisition in terms of its impact on
a multisegmented, online advertising marketplace, the FTC could conclude that the two firms had not, and probably would never, directly compete against each other; Google would continue to sell “advertising on its
125. Keach Hagey & Vivien Ngo, How Google Edged out Rivals and Built the
World’s Dominant Ad Machine: A Visual Guide, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2019, 10:54 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-edged-out-rivals-and-built-the-worldsdominant-ad-machine-a-visual-guide-11573142071 [https://perma.cc/Q3VC4BNT] (alleging most of Google’s market power in online advertising stems from
acquisitions of ad-technology companies, such as DoubleClick).
126. Trefis Team, A Detailed Look at Trends in Advertising Revenues for Google,
Facebook and Amazon, NASDAQ (June 7, 2019, 9:07 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/
articles/detailed-look-trends-advertising-revenues-google-facebook-and-amazon2019-06-07 [https://perma.cc/922Q-LWKD].
127. FTC APPROVAL OF DOUBLECLICK ACQUISITION, supra note 35, at 5. “The
evidence shows that, as with other ads placed through ad intermediaries, most advertisers do not consider contextually targeted ads sold through ad intermediaries
to be substitutes for directly purchased display ads.” Id.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id. The FTC characterized DoubleClick as “the leading firm in the third
party ad serving markets.” Id. These companies primarily work directly with advertisers “in the delivery and tracking of online advertisements.” Id.
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search engine and through its ad intermediation product” and
DoubleClick would continue to operate “third party ad serving products.”130 The FTC also considered each online advertising market segment as competitive with declining prices and margins.131
The FTC dismissed as unlikely or ineffective any attempt by Google to
leverage DoubleClick’s market leadership in third party ad serving to acquire market dominance and pricing power in that and other market
segments:
A leveraging strategy cannot be effective, and thus anticompetitive, unless the merged firm has market power in one of the complementary products. As discussed above, the evidence suggests
that DoubleClick does not have market power despite its high
market share. The third party ad serving markets are competitive
and are likely to become even more so in the future.132
The FTC also discounted any future scenario where Google’s superior
access to consumer behavior data would generate such competitive advantages that the company could acquire market power.133
The far greater accuracy of hindsight,134 but also the contemporaneous dissenting statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, show
severe flaws in the FTC’s assessment of the online advertising marketplace
and the odds for market domination by Google and Facebook. The FTC
concluded that “the dynamic nature” of the online advertising marketplace, the Commission’s factual analysis, and “careful application of tested
antitrust analysis” made even conditional approval of the merger
unnecessary.135
Since 2007, Google and Facebook have become “one stop shops” for
online advertising while direct advertising has severely declined.136 This
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 8–9.
132. Id. at 9–10.
133. “[T]he the evidence failed to show that the accessibility to Google of any
additional data would likely enable it to exercise market power.” Id. at 12. “[T]he
evidence indicates that neither the data available to Google, nor the data available
to DoubleClick, constitutes an essential input to a successful online advertising
product.” Id.
134. “Media companies are so reliant on the proprietary advertising demand
flowing through Google’s AdWords that one executive at a major publisher referred to it as ‘crack.’ ” Hagey & Ngo, supra note 125.
135. FTC APPROVAL OF DOUBLECLICK ACQUISITION, supra note 35.
136. “Much of Google’s power as an ad broker stems from acquisitions of adtechnology companies, especially its 2008 purchase of DoubleClick.” Hagey &
Ngo, supra note 125. “Google will reach a milestone of surpassing 20% of all U.S.
ad spending both online and offline this year. Google captures 74.6% of U.S.
search ad spending. And the company is expected to lead the U.S. digital ad market with a 37.2% share, totaling $48.05 billion this year.” Megan Graham, Google
Says It Competes With ‘Lots of Companies’ in Advertising—Here’s the Hole in That Argument, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/12/
google-the-adtech-industry-is-crowded-and-competitive.html [https://perma.cc/
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migration shows that direct and indirect channels are functionally interchangeable and do compete for the same online advertising revenues.
Google has acquired dominant market share largely as a result of strategic
acquisitions of companies like DoubleClick and its integration with the
company’s advertising buying tool DV360 and the real-time auctions of
advertisements Google manages.137 The company has the potential to
favor its advertising placements and to raise the cost to competitors
through its role as the primary auctioneer for selling digital ads. Further,
Google can favor its own placements throughout its active participation as
the operator of the primary ad server identifying web page space for sale
by publishers, the developer of a buying tool for purchasers of advertisers,
and the seller of its own advertising.”138
The success of Google and Facebook provides answers to questions
posed by Commissioner Harbour about whether these companies could
acquire and maintain competitive advantages in any and all online advertising market segments.139 Ever more invasive data surveillance, the absence of effective privacy protection, coupled with the “winner-take-all”
effects of scale, scope, and positive network effects have created a substantially concentrated web advertising marketplace.140

VH44-G43R]; see also Nicole Perrin, Facebook-Google Duopoly Won’t Crack This Year,
EMARKETER (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/facebook-google
-duopoly-won-t-crack-this-year [https://perma.cc/M2VC-PWLJ].
137. “Google has, at times, provided incentives to use its products in tandem.”
Hagey & Ngo, supra note 125.
A few years ago, Google waived certain fees for DoubleClick for Publishers if an ad sale was made through its AdX exchange, according to a
contract reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Last year, Google merged
those two products—DoubleClick for Publishers and AdX—into a single
product called Google Ad Manager, making it plain to the industry that
they are indeed linked, ad and publishing executives say.
Id.
138. “Overall, Google made $116 billion in advertising revenue last year, a
22% rise from the previous year and 85% of the company’s total revenue.” Id.
“Most of that ad revenue came from Google’s own properties, but the company’s
vast role in brokering online ad sales off its own platforms gives it an added level of
dominance.” Id.
139. For assessments of the FTC’s consumer data protection performance,
see J. Howard Beales III & Timothy Muris, FTC Consumer Protection at 100: 1970s
Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157 (2015);
Jeffrey Eisenach & Illene Knable Gotts, Looking Ahead: The FTC’s Role in Information
Technology Markets, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1876 (2015); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel
Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230
(2015).
140. “One former senior Federal Trade Commission official who supported
the DoubleClick deal in 2008 now regrets it. ‘At the time, it seemed like the right
decision, but things changed a lot in the last dozen years,’ the official said.” Hagey
& Ngo, supra note 125.
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B. The Need for Post-Merger and Acquisition Monitoring and
Mid-Course Corrections
Antitrust enforcement agencies offer assurances that they will require
merging firms to comply with imposed conditions and voluntary commitments. While claiming to remain vigilant, the record shows plenty of instances where regulatory agencies, such as the FCC, did not unilaterally
identify lapses, but instead had to respond to numerous complaints.141
Regulatory agencies apparently have more pressing, current concerns
than making sure that past decisions continue in effect, or that changed
circumstances require a reassessment and recalibration of merger
conditions.
Post-merger performance reviews and compliance audits are essential,142 particularly given the pace of technological and marketplace
changes and incentives for acquiring firms to ignore or evade conditions
that constrain profitability and flexibility. Antitrust enforcement agencies
should validate that the marketplace and the combined venture continue
to operate as expected. Often, reviewing agencies anticipate favorable
public interest and consumer benefits directly attributable to mergers and
acquisitions. Did such public dividends accrue?
Changes in prices offer a readily available, empirical assessment of
marketplace conditions. During their preliminary assessment of a proposed merger and considering whether a firm has violated antitrust law,
reviewing agencies examine whether a specific venture has both the incentive and ability to raise prices, even a small but significant and non-transitory increase. Merger applicants often promise not to raise prices for a
time period after regulatory approval.
Merged ventures do not always lower prices, share cost savings generated by efficiency gains and elimination of double marginalization,143 or
141. See, e.g., Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 27 F.C.C.
Rcd. 4891 (2012) (partially granting a complaint that Comcast failed to assign a
channel to Bloomberg business network in the vicinity of other business networks).
142. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 74 (asserting that post-merger conduct may
pursue anticompetitive goals without effective oversight and remedies).
143. Salop, supra note 56, at 1970–71.
While many vertical mergers, like many horizontal mergers, may entail
efficiency benefits, the [end of double marginalization] EDM theory does
not prove that vertical mergers are almost always procompetitive. Claims
that EDM must lead to lower downstream prices are overstated for several
reasons. First, if the upstream firm sells to rivals at a higher price than
charged to the downstream merging firm, then diverting sales to its
downstream partner creates an “opportunity cost” resulting from lower
upstream profits, which mitigates or eliminates the incentive to reduce
the downstream price. Second, if the downstream firm’s price reduction
would be given to a large number of existing customers relative to the
number of new customers diverted from firms that did not buy the upstream firm’s input, then the incentive to cut the downstream price will
also be mitigated or eliminated. Third, double marginalization may have
been totally or partially eliminated in the premerger market by contracts
with quantity forcing or “nonlinear” pricing. Fourth, EDM would not be
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become more innovative, competitive, and employment generating.
Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies rarely get re-involved when a
merger’s anticipated procompetitive enhancements did not arise. Involvement has occurred when the combined venture allegedly failed to comply
with conditions contained in a merger approval. For example, the FCC
granted the application of Sirius and XM digital audio radio ventures144 to
merge based on the argument that one or both companies would fail absent their combination. The Commission also accepted such a broad relevant market definition that even the creation of a monopoly in satellite
radio did not raise significant public interest concerns because consumers
had plenty of competitive alternatives available including broadcast radio
and compact disks. The merged venture has thrived, and the anticipated
competition with other functional equivalent options has not foreclosed
the company from raising rates significantly and inserting a variety of new
billing line items for non-regulatory costs such as copyright royalty payments. The FCC got involved post-merger only after receiving numerous
complaints about Sirius XM’s failure to comply with a merger
condition.145
Extensive consolidation in other internet markets, including cable television, cellular radio, broadcasting, and landline telephone service, typically does not result in lower rates for consumers. In some instances, even
a merger proponent, Comcast, acknowledged that consumers would not
receive any rate reductions as a result of acquisitions framed as enhancing
competition and serving the public interest.146 Internet mergers and acquisitions appear to enhance the ability of surviving firms to increase consumer costs well in excess of general measures of inflation.

merger-specific if it can be achieved as a practical matter absent the
merger. Fifth, there is no EDM if the downstream firm’s technology is
incompatible with the upstream firm’s inputs. Finally, the existence of
EDM does not prove that the merger is procompetitive. An EDM incentive to reduce prices may be dominated by the incentives to raise prices
resulting from foreclosure or coordination. Thus, the potential for EDM
is not a valid rationale for weak or nonexistent enforcement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
144. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee,
23 F.C.C. Rcd. 12,348 (2008).
145. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 6968 (2012).
146. In a conference call to reporters, a Comcast Executive Vice President
explained, “[w]e’re certainly not promising that customer bills are going to go
down, or even that they’re going to increase less rapidly.” Statement in Opposition
to Comcast’s Proposed Acquisition of Time Warner Cable at 6 n.19, Applications
of Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations (2014) (MB Docket No. 14-57) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Transcript of Comcast/Time Warner Cable Conference
Call with Reporters (2014)), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521817502.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/A9YR-B678].
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C. More Sophisticated, Nuanced, Granular, and Empirical Calculation of
Consumer Benefits and Costs
Antitrust enforcement agencies, well versed in Chicago School law
and economic doctrine, emphasize the need to consider impact on consumers. With zero out-of-pocket costs to consumers and massive subscriber numbers, internet ventures such as Google and Facebook have
avoided close scrutiny, even for acquisitions of firms that might have offered a competitive alternative. Similar reluctance to probe has applied to
platform intermediaries, such as Airbnb, Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Ebay,
PayPal, and Uber that offer faster, better, smarter, more convenient, and
possibly cheaper services.
Consumer welfare analysis typically does not require much empirical
statistical analysis and quantification of benefits and costs. If merger advocates can create a compelling narrative claiming consumer welfare enhancement and guarantees of competition, innovation, stimulation, and
limited loss of employment numbers, then reviewers appear to give them
the benefit of the doubt.
Merger advocates appear able to enhance their prospects with antitrust enforcement agencies by injecting other non-empirical, non-quantifiable factors such as national security, industrial policy, national pride,
technological leadership, and fostering closer parity of access to internet
services between rural and urban residents. These factors make antitrust
less scientific and more politicized.
Consider the merger of Sprint and T-Mobile, the third and fourth
carriers in terms of national market penetration by wireless telecommunications ventures. These companies undertook an aggressive campaign to
frame their merger not in terms of horizontal integration resulting in even
more market concentration, but rather competition-enhancing by making
the combined carrier better able to compete aggressively with the two
dominant carriers: AT&T and Verizon. Their campaign eschewed math
and conventional antitrust law and economics, replacing them with broad
and loose arguments touting how the nation, consumers, and competition
will improve if the carriers can merge.
The merger of T-Mobile and Sprint was touted as the best way for the
United States to retain or regain global leadership in fifth generation (5G)
wireless technology and to serve vital national security interests.147 The
147. “Expanding 5G access to all Americans will also enhance the benefits of
5G innovation for the overall United States economy and will support American
technological leadership. The larger the United States’ 5G user base, and the
broader its nationwide coverage, the greater the opportunity for entrepreneurs
and innovators.” Applications of T-Mobile US, Inc., and Sprint Corp. For Consent
to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, Declaratory Ruling, and Order of Proposed Modification, 34 F.C.C. Rcd.
10,578, 10,583 (2019). “The network benefits of the T-Mobile/Sprint transaction
will thus extend beyond mobile wireless services alone, to enhance the competitiveness of the United States’ economy.” Id.
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companies implied that sinister foreign ventures could harm the national
interest and engage in espionage if they dominated 5G infrastructure deployment. Somehow the merger of Sprint and T-Mobile will prevent companies like Huawei and ZTE from offering lower cost 5G technology at
home and abroad.
In frequent advertisements, Sprint and T-Mobile claimed that the
merged company would quickly remedy persistently expensive and inferior wireless service, particularly in rural areas. While ignoring how they
could not have improved conditions as standalone companies, Sprint and
T-Mobile claimed that as a combined venture the nation’s wireless posture
will improve significantly.148 The companies never explained how they
lacked access to debt and equity financing, or any other shortfall occurring as competitors instead of collaborators. The combined company offered a binding commitment to freeze rates for three years, and to bridge
the so-called digital divide by making wireless broadband robust, affordable, and ubiquitous, outcomes three national carriers can achieve that
four apparently could not.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust market impact analysis requires far more than slogans, conjecture, and lobbyists. Recent derisive criticism of reform efforts ignores
the real prospect that the failure to recalibrate antitrust review will result
in more flawed assessments and substantial harms. Even some scholars at
the University of Chicago have begun to reconsider deep-seated doctrine
and assumptions about how markets operate.149
Antitrust enforcement agencies should commit to rigorous, empirically driven analyses as free as possible from politics. This independence
avoids reliance on sponsored research that would never pass muster using
peer review, results-driven decision making, and slavish devotion to current economic doctrine. Internet market assessment requires the willingness to consider impacts to consumers and competition arising from a
broader array of factors and stakeholders. Internet mergers and acquisitions have yet to trigger a more nuanced and sophisticated assessment to
offset reduced regulatory oversight and consumer safeguards.150 At a time
148. “We’ve united and combined our resources to bring customers the connectivity, service, and value they deserve. We are taking things to an entirely new
level! With the arrival of the new T-Mobile, consumers and businesses win—when
it’s more important than ever.” T-MOBILE, Why Have T-Mobile and Sprint Merged?
https://www.t-mobile.com/brand/t-mobile-sprint-merger-updates?ds_rl=1082060
&ds_rl=1264208&cmpid=ADV_PB_P_20NEWTMO_43700049462900002_4347183
99537&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIxur836n16QIVk-eGCh0ClgAlEAAYASAAEgKRHvD_
BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds [https://perma.cc/S3AN-MC2U] (last visited July 18, 2020).
149. See Ianni Drivas, Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, U. CHI. L.
SCH. (June 4, 2019), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/reassessing-chicagoschool-antitrust-law [https://perma.cc/T5J5-5T64].
150. “Even within a purely economic framework, merger review is flawed.
The fact that a merger may be designed to eliminate a future or ‘potential’ com-
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when deregulation reduces or eliminates the first, and possibly only, form
of government oversight,151 antitrust review offers an essential guard
against the potential for both false negatives and false positives.152
The approval of AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner revalidates the
conventional wisdom that vertical integration has little if any potential for
harm, notwithstanding credible evidence to the contrary. The FTC’s approval of DoubleClick’s acquisition by Google evidences a profound disinclination to consider markets as constituting numerous segments for
which competitors can readily enter and exit. The DOJ’s conditional approval of the T-Mobile and Sprint merger evidenced incredible willingness
to deflect concerns about real potential harm in a wireless services oligopoly with broad, mostly unenforceable promises of better days ahead.
More broadly, antitrust enforcement agencies appear disinclined to
probe whether markets operate in ways that defy simple modeling along
vertical and horizontal planes. Technological and market convergence
promote the development of a fully diversified company offering multiple
products and services throughout any and all food chains. Noncompeting
ventures may soon vie for the same customer base, particularly in converging internet markets where options for accessing video content have
increased.
Antitrust enforcement agencies also need to use better calibrated
tools to assess the current and future impacts of mergers and acquisitions.
Several transactions that eliminated double marginalization did not generate any measurable savings passed onto consumers, despite the economic
doctrine that touts efficiency gains and cost savings. Assuming such benefits did occur, antitrust reviewers need to confront scenarios where acquiring firms encounter such insufficient competition that they had no
commercial necessity to share the financial benefits from mergers with
consumers. Perhaps the lack of such competitive necessity calls into question whether the approved transaction had no adverse effect on the potential for monopolization, concentration of market power, and harm to
competition and consumers.
This Article has identified several instances where strict adherence to
conventional law and economic doctrine has supported mergers and acpetitor is often ignored as too speculative.” WU, supra note 1, at 128. “That’s why
American and European agencies allowed Facebook and Google to buy many of
their major potential competitors. Innovation and dynamic effects, being harder
to measure, do not get due consideration.” Id.
151. In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004), the Supreme Court held that antitrust review should offer no greater
oversight or remedies than that available from regulatory review. See Verizon
Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 407. This case appears to establish precedent for eliminating antitrust review and potential remedies if regulatory agencies have opted to
reduce or eliminate oversight.
152. Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Deregulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1922, 1959
(2018) (arguing against reducing antitrust enforcement, particularly in light of
substantial deregulation).
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quisitions that did not warrant summary conclusions about the absence of
harm to consumers and competition. Such false negatives should necessitate soul searching and a conscientious willingness to rethink the viability
of highly revered doctrine and the wisdom of regulatory forbearance in
ever-concentrating internet markets.
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